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Abstract
1
. 
This article introduces new models of dis-intermediation of the real estate broker by the buyer or the seller.  
The decision to retain a real estate broker is critical in the property purchase/sale process.  The existing literature 
does not contain analysis of: 1) information asymmetry, 2) the conditions under which it will be optimal to 
disintermediate the broker, 3) social capital and reputation, 4) the impact of different types of real estate brokerage 
contracts. The article shows that dis-intermediation of the real estate broker by the seller or buyer may be optimal 
in certain conditions.   
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1. Internet-Based Dis-Intermediation In Real Estate Transactions.   
In the US, the residential real estate brokerage industry alone has annual revenues of more than $60 billion. 
However, the industry is consolidating and brokerage commissions are declining.  The industry is regulated.  Many 
companies have tried (mostly un-successfully to shift brokerage operations onto the Internet.  These companies 
have learned to use the Internet as a marketing, information-resource and educational tool. Benjamin, Chinloy, 
Judd & Winkler (2005); Tse & Webb (2002); Bond & Seiler, Blake (2000); Diehl, Kornish & Lynch (2003); 
Bolton, Warlop & Alba (2003); Carmon & Ariely (2001); Stavrovski (2004); Wu & Colwell (1986); Katz (1990); 
Bakos, Lucas, Oh & Simon, et al (2005).   
 
2. Existing Literature. 
The existing literature on the economics of real estate brokerage, provision of online information, and possible 
disintermediation is extensive.  See: Gwin (2004); Miceli, Pancak & Sirmans (2000); Yavas, Miceli & Sirmans 
(2001); Tuccillo (1997); Curran & Schrag (2000); Rutherford, Springer &Yavas (2004); Muhanna & Wolf (2002); 
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D’Urso (_____); Johnson, Springer & Brockman (2005); Quint & Wako (2004); Lurie (2004); Schmitz (2000); 
Scott (2000); Munneke & Yavas (2001); Mantrala & Zabel (1995); Anglin (1997); Sirmans, Turnbull & Benjamin 
(1991); Zumpano & Elder (1994); Zumpano, Elder & Baryla (1996); Wheaton (1990); Bajtelsmit & Worzala 
(1997); Yavas (1992); Arnold (1999).  On dynamical systems, also see: Beer (2000); Dellnitz & Junge (1999); 
Friedman & Sandler (1996); Agarwal, Bohner, O’Regan & Peterson (2002); Iacus (2001); Van Gelder (1998); 
Izmailov & Solodov (2001); Iri (1997); Mordukhovich & Shao (1997); Van Dalen (June 1995); Anglin & Arnott 
(1991); Hodgkinson (1997); Williams (1998); Korczynski & Ott (2005); Garmaise & Moskowitz (2004); 
Kauffman, Subramani & Wood (2000); Elder (2000); Bui, Yen & Sankaran (2001); Rutherford, Springer & Yavas 
(2004); Dale-Johnson (1998); Dolde & Tirtiroglu (1997); Fleck (2000); Evans (1998); Janssen & Jobson  (1980); Moore 
(1991); Nelles (2002); Quan (2002); Williams (1998); Yavas & Colwell (1999); Benjamin, Chinloy, Jud & 
Winkler (2006); Lewis & Anderson  (1999); Geltner, Kluger & Miller (1991); Delcoure & Miller (2002); Angilini 
(2005); Williams (1998); Anderson & Fok (1998); Anderson, Lewis & Zumpano (1999); Austin (1973); Barlett 
(1981); Benjamin, Jud  & Sirmans (2000); Guttery, Baen & Benjamin (2000); Jud, Rogers & Crellin (1994); Jud & 
Winkler (1998); Jud & Winkler (2000); Lewis & Anderson (1999); Marsh & Zumpano (1988); Miller & Shedd 
(1979); Muhanna (2000); Muneke & Yavas (2001); Owen & Kickbacks (1977); Turnbull (1996); Worzala & 
McCarthy (2006); Wachter (1987); Yavas (2001); Yinger (1993); Zumpano, Anderson, Baryla & Johnson (2001); 
Zumpano, Elder, Elder & Crellin (1993).  On reputation and social capital, see: Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1994); 
Fang (2005); Bouzdine & Bourakova-Lorgnier (April 2004); Guennif & Revest (2005); Black, Carnes & 
Richardson (2000); Swain (2003); Al-Ubaydli (March 2005); Burt (2000); Seierup (1996); Fine (1999); Annen 
(_____); Schmid (2000); Glaeser, Laibson & Sacedote (2002); Narayan & Pritchett (1999); Durlauf (2002); 
Bowles & Gintis (2002); Dasgupta (2005); Milgrom & Roberts (1982); Kreps & Wilson (1982).    
  However, the existing literature omits the following analysis:  
 The amount of information that the real estate Broker should provide on the web. 
 When the Broker should provide information on the web.  
 Relevant conditions under which the buyer and or seller should dis-intermediate the real estate broker; and 
quantification of such conditions.  
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  Quantification of effects of the type of real estate brokerage contract; and constraints imposed by the 
brokerage contracts. 
 Differentiation among different types of customer search costs (physical and Internet).  
 The buyer’s/seller’s decision to retain or dis-intermediate a real estate Broker within the context of the 
buyer’s and seller’s Social Capital and or Reputation Capital.    
 Effect of Broker’s Social Capital and Reputation Capital.    
 Incorporation/recognition of limitations of Rationality in economic analysis/modeling - brokers, buyers 
and sellers are subject to emotions, regret, risk-aversion, and other psychological effects.   
 Analysis of buyer utility gained from interactions with Broker; analysis of seller utility gained from 
dealing with the Broker. Most studies errornuously equate buyer/seller utility with monetary outcomes for 
the buyer/seller.  
 Elimination of ‘equilibrium’ in economic analysis; Colman (2003); Hertwig & Ortmann (2001); Arthur 
(April 1999); Bromiley & Papenhausen (______).   
 
3. Models. 
This section develops theoretical models of real estate brokerage, information asymmetry among the 
broker, buyer and seller; broker supply of information via the Internet, and possible disintermediation of the 
broker.  The models result in testable hypothesis about:  
 When the Broker should provide information on the web.  The optimal amount of information that the 
Broker should provide on the web.  
 When the buyer should dis-intermediate the broker.  
 Conditions under which the seller should disintermediate the broker 
  The Broker’s objective function. 
 The effects of social capital and reputation capital on the decision to disintermediate or hire the broker.  
      
Assumptions:  
 Brokers do not restrict access to information that they provide on the Internet. 
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 The only difference in Closing Costs between situations where the broker is used and where the broker is 
dis-intermediated, is the Broker’s fees. 
 
P = estimated/appraised value of housing unit. P  (0, +∞).            
Pb = The value of the housing unit to the Buyer. Pb  (0, +∞).            
Ps = Value of home to the Seller.  Ps  (-∞, +∞).           
c = percentage commission rate paid to Broker by Seller.  0 < c < 1. 
Bb = broker’s total fixed cost of providing information to a buyer – this includes rent, utilities, subscriptions to 
databases, telephones, administrative staff, operating expenses, etc..  Most are fixed costs and semi-fixed costs. Bb 
 (-∞, +∞).           
Bn = Broker’s total cost of searching for a new client.  Assumes that broker has to prospect n number of 
prospective clients for each actual new client obtained.  Bn  (-∞, +∞).           
Bop = Broker’s total operating expenses per transaction. Assumes that broker has to prospect n number of 
prospective clients for each actual new client obtained. Bop  (-∞, +∞).           
Bs = Broker’s fixed cost of dealing with seller and listing property. Bs  (-∞, +∞).           
Bi = Broker’s amortized periodic fixed cost of providing information on the website – this includes the amortized 
cost of building the website, hosting/bandwidth costs, website maintainance costs and the incremental costs of 
uploading info0rmation about any one property.  However, the incremental costs of uploading information about 
any one property are relatively small. Bi  (-∞, +∞).           
Bit = Broker’s cost of providing information on the website – this includes the present value of the total cost of 
building the website, hosting/bandwidth costs, website maintainance costs and the incremental costs of uploading 
information about any one property.  Bit  (-∞, +∞).           
 
I = the amount of information (I) communicated to the buyer by broker; and the following conditions apply:   
1. I/Bb > 0; 
2
I/Bb
2
 > 0. 
2. I = Ip + Ii 
 
Ip = value of information provided personally by broker. Ip  (-∞, +∞).            
Ii = value of information provided by broker on the website. Ii  (-∞, +∞).           
Io = value of information (about subject property and market conditions) obtained from all websites (other 
websites, and Broker’s website) by buyer. Ii  Io .  Io  (-∞, +∞).             
b = Buyer’s search costs without internet.  b  (-∞, +∞).           
bi = Buyer’s search costs with internet use.  bi  (-∞, +∞).           
s = Seller’s search costs with Broker but without internet and other resources. s  (-∞, +∞).            
si = Seller’s search costs with internet use and other resources but without Broker. si  (-∞, +∞).            
sb = Seller’s search costs with Broker and with internet use. sb  (-∞, +∞).          
Uip = utility gained by buyer from information that broker communicates personally – utility measured in terms of 
usefulness towards  closing the transaction, psychological comfort, attention to detail, enhancement of ability to 
compare/contrast properties, perception of neighborhood, etc..  Utility is different from value of information 
(which strictly refers to usefulness towards closing a transaction).  Uip  (-∞, +∞).           
Uiw = utility gained by buyer from information that broker communicates via the web – utility measured in terms of 
usefulness of information towards closing the transaction, choice of properties to buy, psychological comfort, 
attention to detail, enhancement of ability to compare/contrast properties, perception of neighborhood, etc..  Utility 
is different from value of information (which strictly refers to usefulness towards closing a transaction).  Uiw  (-
∞, +∞).     
Ua = utility gained by buyer from information he/she obtains from the web (including the broker’s website) without 
communicating with the Broker.  Ua  (-∞, +∞).           
Usp = utility gained by seller from information that broker communicates personally – utility measured in terms of 
usefulness towards closing the transaction, psychological comfort, attention to detail, enhancement of ability to 
compare/contrast properties, perception of neighborhood, etc..  Utility is different from value of information 
(which strictly refers to usefulness towards closing a transaction).  Usp  (-∞, +∞).           
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Usw = utility gained by seller from information that broker communicates via the web – utility measured in terms of 
usefulness of information towards closing the transaction, choice of properties to buy, psychological comfort, 
attention to detail, enhancement of ability to compare/contrast properties, perception of neighborhood, etc..  Utility 
is different from value of information (which strictly refers to usefulness towards closing a transaction). Usw  (-∞, 
+∞).           
Usa = utility gained by seller from information he/she obtains from the web (including the broker’s website) 
without communicating with the Broker.  Usa  (-∞, +∞).           
b = additional closing costs, other than broker’s labor-rate, if broker is used.  This includes Seller’s time spent 
negotiating/discussing terms with Broker.  b  (-∞, +∞).           
i = additional closing costs, other than broker’s labor-rate, if broker is dis-intermediated. i  (-∞, +∞).           
sb = closing costs, if broker is used.  sb  (-∞, +∞).           
s = closing costs, if broker is not used.  s  (-∞, +∞).            
Es = a state where broker has a super-exclusive listing – seller must pay broker regardless of how buyer meets 
seller.  Broker’s profits are guaranteed upon sale. Broker can share commissions with other brokers who participate 
in the sale. The state is characterized and quantified based on the Broker’s effort (hours spent, value of broker’s 
mental processes), Broker’s Labor-rate, and value of brokerage contract.  Es  (-∞, +∞).                    
Ep = a state where broker has semi-exclusive listing and broker is paid only if the transaction is consumated as a 
direct result of a buyer introduced by the broker.  Seller can still sell based on his/her own efforts and not pay the 
commission.  The state is characterized and quantified based on the Broker’s effort (hours spent, value of broker’s 
mental processes), Broker’s Labor-rate, and value of brokerage contract.  Ep  (-∞, +∞).                      
Em = a state where multiple listing is used, and broker is only one of many brokers that can sell the property.  
Broker.  Broker is paid only if the transaction is consumated as a direct result of a buyer introduced by the broker. 
The state is characterized and quantified based on the Broker’s effort (hours spent, value of broker’s mental 
processes), Broker’s Labor-rate, and value of brokerage contract.  Em  (-∞, +∞).        
p = probability of closing the sale if broker provides information primarily in physical space, and the transaction 
is done only in (or primarily in) physical space.  Probability is assessed in terms of broker’s track record, average 
time-on-the-market, local demographics, broker’s social capital and internet networks, broker’s reputation, average 
weekly leisure time (#of hours) of males/females in the area with sufficient income to purchase, etc.       
i =  probability of closing the sale if information is provided by broker primarily through the Internet, and 
transaction is processed mostly through the Internet (online forms, automated mortgage applications, etc.). 
Probability is assessed in terms of broker’s track record, average time-on-the-market for properties in the area, 
broker’s social capital and internet networks, broker’s reputation, local demographics, internet penetration rate, 
internet access, education levels, etc.       
s =  probability of closing the sale if seller does not hire the broker.  The Seller uses the Internet and other 
resources to sell the property. Probability is assessed in terms of average time-on-the-market for housing units in 
the area, local demographics, internet penetration rate, internet access, education levels, seller’s knowledge of the 
internet, seller’s knowledge of local real estate markets and mortgages, seller’s disposable income, seller’s social 
capital, seller’s reputation capital, existence of un-usual circumstances (healthcare problems, seller relocation, 
seller financial distress, etc.).          
 
ά  = broker’s effort – which is the sum of the broker’s labor/time costs, office operating expenses (rent, equipment, 
professional fees, transportation costs, office supplies, cost of memberships in professional organizations and MLC 
systems, professional insurance, etc.), and other costs required to complete one purchase/sale transaction. ά  (-∞, 
+∞).             
 άs = buyer’s perception of value of broker’s effort.  άs  (-∞, +∞).           
RCbr = Broker’s Reputation capital gained from the transaction– which is non-cash and varies with broker’s 
efforts, broker’s knowledge, transaction sizes, etc. and -∞< RCbr/e < ∞; RCbr  (-∞, +∞).   
SCbr = Broker’s social capital gained/lost due to the transaction – which is non-cash and varies with broker effort, 
knowledge, ability to build and maintain relationships, social networks, etc., and  -∞< SCbr/e < ∞; SCbr  (-∞, 
+∞).      
SCs = value of Seller’s social capital.  Seller’s social capital is a function of familiarity with the 
neighborhood/town, social networks, reputation, etc.  SCs  (-∞, +∞).            
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SCb = value of Buyer’s social capital. -∞< SCb < ∞.  Seller’s social capital is a function of familiarity with the 
neighborhood/town, social networks, reputation, etc. SCb  (-∞, +∞).            
 
A buyer will disintermediate the broker if the following conditions exist:  
1. Ii > Ip  (Uiw > Uip); (Ii + Io) > Ip  (Uiw > Uip); 
2. Ii   b; information costs are similar 
3. [{cP + b + b}{{Ps  Pb}  Max (Em, Ep, Es)} ] > {bi + i + Uiw}  
4. [{cP + b + b}  {(Uiw > Uip)  Max (Em, Ep, Es)} ] > {bi + i + Uiw}  
5. b  > bi ; and Uiw  > Uip          
6. (2b /Uip
2) < Min[(2bi /Uiw
2), 1]; and (b  / Uip) < Min[(bi /Uiw), 1];     
7. (Uiw /i) > Min[(Uip/b), 0]; and {(
2Uiw /i
2 ) > Min[(2Uip/b
2), 0]};            
8. (2Io/bi
2)>  Max[2(Ip+Ii)/b
2, 1]; and (Io/bi) > Max[(Ip + Ii)/b), 1] 
9. (Ip+Ii)/Max (Em, Ep, Esw) < 1;  
10. (Ip+Ii)/(Uip+Uiw) < Min[(Io/Ua), 1]; and 
2(Ip+Ii)/(Uip+Uiw)
2 < Min[(2Io/Ua
2), 1]; 
11. 3(Ip+Ii)/(Uip+Uiw)
3 < 1; and 3Io/Ua
3 < 1; 
12. (3Pb/P
3) > Max[(3Io/(Ip+Ii)
3), 1]; and {Pb/P > Max[(Io/(Ip+Ii)), 1]}; 
13.  (άs) < (cP +  sb + Ip +  Ii)      
14. [(άs)/(sb + Ip + Ii)] < 1     
15. (SCb - bi - b )  >  (Uip + Uiw + Ip + Ii +  b)   
16. SCb/Max(bi,b)  >  Max[1, (Uip+Uiw)/(Ip+Ii+b); and   
17. 2SCb/Max(bi , b)
2  >  Max [0, 2 (Uip+Uiw)/ (Ip+Ii+b)
 2;  
18. SCb/Max(bi , b)  >  Max [1, (i∩p)/(Uip+Uiw)];  
19. 2SCb/Max(bi , b)
2  >  Max [0, 2(i∩p)/(Uip+Uiw)
2];                      
 
The broker will have incentives to provide information on the website if the following conditions exist: 
1. [{(cP*p) – Bb - Bs } < {Bi} ]  [(b > bi)  Ep] 
2. [Uip < Uiw ]  Max(Es, Ep) 
3. (bi * i ) > {cP * p} 
4. i/p   0 
5. i/B   0; p/B   0 
6. Bi <  (RCbr + SCbr);  
7. (RCbr+SCbr)/Bi > 1  
 
 
The Seller will dis-intermediate the Broker if the following conditions exist: 
1. s > (p ∩ i); .   s > p, i;     
2. Io/si > Max[(Ip+Io)/ sb, 1]; and ³Io/si³ > Max[³(Ip+Io)/sb³, 1];                     
3. Ua/si  > [(Usp +Usw)/s, 1]; and ³Ua/si³ > [³(Usp+Usw)/s³, 1]         
4. s   > si;  and s│Max (Em, Ep, Es) > si│Max (Em, Ep, Es)           
5. Io > (Ii+ Ip);  and Io│Max (Em, Ep, Es) > (Ii+Ip)│Max (Em, Ep, Es)            
6. Ps/P > 1; 
7. sb/(Usp+Usw) > s/Usa ; and sb > s;                  
8. P/sb > Max[P > s, 1];  Ps/sb > Max[Ps > s, 1]; Ps/P > 1; P/c > 1    
9. (sb+sb) > (si+s);  and  (sb+sb)/Ps >  (si+s)/Ps;                        
10. (sb+sb)/c  > (si+s)/c                 
11. (sb+sb)/sb > (si+s)/sb          
12. s > p , i           
13. 0∫
T 
{s (Ps - b - s -si) t> Max[  0∫
T 
{(p)*(P- b-sb- s)t}, 0∫
T 
{(i∩p)*(P- b-sb-sb) t}]          
14. (SCs - si-(sb-sb))  >  (Usw + Usp + Ip + Ii + sb)     
15. SCs/Max(si,s)  >  Max[1, (Usp+Usw)/(Ip+Ii+b);  
16. 2SCs/Max(si , s)
2  >  Max [0, 2 (Usp+Usw)/ (Ip+Ii+b)
 2;  
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17. SCs/Max(si , s)  >  Max [1, (i∩p)/(Usp+Usw)];  
18.  2SCs/Max(si , s)
2  >  Max [0, 2(i∩p)/(Usp+Usw)
2];                      
 
Regardless of whatever effort (ά ) broker makes, the broker’s compensation consists of: 1) the brokerage fee, 
which is cash compensation and does not vary with broker effort (ά ), and 2) Reputation capital (RCbr) which is 
non-cash and varies with broker’s efforts and knowledge, size of the transaction, frequency of broker’s 
transactions, and the ratio of the broker’s  closed sale/purchase transactions to total the broker’s possible 
sales/purchase transactions - and RCbr/ά  (-∞, +∞); and 3) social capital (SCbr) which is non-cash and varies 
with broker effort, broker’s knowledge, broker’s ability to build and maintain relationships, social networks, etc., 
and SCb/ά  (-∞, +∞).  The literature on social capital, trust and reputation capital is extensive.  See: Rangan 
(2000); Lee, Wu, Maguluru & Nichols (2006); Kauffman, Subramani & Wood (2000); Garmaise & Moskowitz 
(2004); Ferrary (2003); Korczynski & Ott (2005); Pollock (2004).   Kreps & Wilson (1982); Milgrom & Roberts 
(1982); Hellman & Murdock (1998),  On reputation and social capital, see: Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1994); Fang 
(2005); Bouzdine & Bourakova-Lorgnier (April 2004); Guennif & Revest (2005); Black, Carnes & Richardson 
(2000); Swain (2003); Al-Ubaydli (March 2005); Burt (2000); Seierup (1996); Fine  (1999); Annen (_____); 
Schmid (2000); Glaeser, Laibson & Sacedote (2002); Narayan & Pritchett (1999); Durlauf (2002); Bowles & 
Gintis (2002); Dasgupta (2005); Milgrom & Roberts (1982); Kreps & Wilson (1982).  The typically constant 
brokerage commission cP, is modified by the possible states Es, Em and Ep, and quality of information provided by 
the broker, Ii and Ip.  The broker’s effort levels are constrained by the Brokerage Agreement, the agreed upon 
brokerage fee, state contract laws, and state real estate brokerage laws, the Broker’s capital, the Broker’s 
opportunity costs, and the mechanics of Multiple Listing Service systems.  Hence, one of the broker’s objectives is 
to ensure that the sum of the value of his/her effort plus other resources contributed to the search, does not exceed 
the brokerage fee less a reasonable profit.    
Contrary to most housing demand models and brokerage industry models, the occurrence of the event ‘cP’  
isn’t binary (ie. the housing-unit/property is sold or is not sold), and there are some key considerations:     
 There are psychological influences that affect the buyer’s decision and the sellers decision – including 
perceived sincereity of broker, affinity for certain locations/features/sizes/colors, time considerations, 
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perception/cognition, intuition about prices, the perceived financial burden arising from payment terms 
(size of down payment, etc.), and other factors.    
 
 The buyer’s choice of, or combinations of Ii and Ip is highly subjective and depends on many variables 
(including region, internet access, level of education of buyer, buyer’s perception/cognition, buyer’s 
income, family structure, buyer’s temperament, value of buyer’s time, buyer’s familiarity with internet 
transactions, etc.) and is not completely controlled by the broker – the buyer can search for information 
about properties offered by the broker by using other databases and website, and even if the buyer does not 
have the subject-property’s address, the buyer can also easily do online searches for comparable properties 
in the same region, and gain high-value information about prices and sale terms.   
 
 In calculating how much information that the broker should provide on the web, the following 
considerations apply: 
a) In state Em, the buyer can use the information and still close the transaction with another broker. 
b) In most instances, Ip > Ii; and the incremental cost of providing Ii is relatively small.  A broker’s website can be 
built for $400-3,000 and website hosting costs are $1-30 per month.  The seller will typically supply pictures of the 
property and input property-specific data.  The broker can easily obtain neighborhood data from commercial 
databases. 
c) If the broker chooses to provide information online, the broker will typically provide standard data about the 
property or a minimum amount of information. The key issue then is which information most influences property 
sales/purchases and is discretionary ? the answer is most likely, comprehensive pictures, historical details of 
significance (previous owners/tenants, previous uses, etc.), construction details, and information about property 
conditions.  For the broker, the incremental costs of providing such information is relatively minimal because most 
of it is provided by the seller.  Broker has a strong incentive to maximize Ii.  The utility value of Ii (Ubi) is typically 
much greater than the utility value of Ip, (Ubp) because Ii is perceptively more ‘permanent’, easily accessible 
regardless of time, and is typically more credible.  In some jurisdiction, there may be rules/laws about the 
minimum amount of information that the broker has to disclose about a property. The tradeoff between providing 
   
 
9 
too much information Ii, and disintermediation of the broker is substantially affected by the existence of states Es, 
Em or Ep.  On information and price dispersion on the Internet, see: Baylis & Perloff (2002); Arnold (2000); Bakos 
(1997);  Buyukozkan G (2004);  Bryjolfsson & Smith (1999).          
 
 
Hence the real estate broker’s general problem is a multi-criteria maximization and minimization problem:  
  
 Min [{Bb + Bs + Bi+ Bn}  Min (Es,Ep,Em) ] 
Max [SCbr + RCbr]     
OR  
 
Max [SCbr + RCbr -Bb - Bs - Bi- Bn]  Min (Es,Ep,Em) ] 
   
 
s.t.: 
 
cP > Max [0; (Bb + Bs + Bi)]; where cP = fixed amount x.   
c, P > 0 
p > 0 
i > 0 
 
 
In calculating the Buyer’s search costs, the buyer’s time and the buyer’s information processing 
capabilities are major components, and a distinction has to be made between two types of ‘time’:  
1. “Valued time’ – for which buyer can be compensated for work done. 
2. “Leisure time” – for which there is no compensation.  Most searches are done using Leisure Time. 
 
Gwin’s (2004:15, 11-17) contention that “……. more information will be provided on websites in countries 
where buyers have a high cost of search……” is not valid.  In fact the opposite is more likely to occur, because 
search costs are directly related to internet access and level of sophistication of telecomm infrastructure.  Hence, its 
more likely that more information will be provided on a US realtor’s website, than on a Costa Rican realtor’s 
website because: 
 Internet penetration is much lower in Costa Rica. 
 The cheapest search is online searches. 
 The US realtor is more wiling to adapt to the Internet than the Costa Rican realtor (because the US realtor 
is more likely to be at a substantial competitive disadvantage by not using the Internet). 
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 Most standardized real estate data is delivered via the Internet. 
 The US realtor’s company/office is more likely to be part of a larger network of brokers rely on the 
Internet for daily operations.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Broker disintermediation can radically alter the structure of the real estate industry, and coupled with the 
Internet, can radically change the nature of buying and selling processes and the mortgage lending processes. 
This article has shown that full broker dis-intermediation maybe optimal for the seller and or buyer under 
certain conditions; while partial dis-intermediation may also be optimal under certain conditions.  With continued 
increases in internet availability, partial disintermediation is likely to become the most common form of 
relationship between the seller and the broker.  
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